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I. INTRODUCTION
C hemical dependency in this country costs employers over 75 billion
dollars annually in reduced productivity.' In an effort to maintain a
safe and profitable business, employers have attempted to deter sub-
stance abuse through the use of drug testing programs. The implemen-
tation of such programs has been the source of great concern within
organized labor.2 Unions have asserted that drug testing is both invasive
of an individual's right to privacy, and unreliable. 3 As a result, manage-
ment's insistence on drug testing has forced the unions to seek protection
against unreasonable testing programs.4
Traditionally, our legal system has safeguarded against actions intru-
sive of an individual's rights. However, in the case of drug testing, the
legal system has allowed little security to private sector union members. 5
' Research Triangle Institute, Economic Cost to Society of Alcohol and Drug Abuse and
Mental Illness: 1980, at 3 (June, 1984)(submitted to Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration Office Program Planning and Coordination. Park 1 Building, Room
13C-15, 5600 Fisher's Lane, Rockville, MD 20857). Among drug users, absenteeism is 2.5
times greater than non-drug users, medical claims are three times higher than non-drug
users, and accidents three or four times more likely. Id.
2 See Section II of this Note.
' See Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, Local Union 1900, Arb. No.
16-30-0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.).
4 See supra note 2.
P. Petesch, A Legal Perspective on Alcohol and Drug Programs in the Workplace 3
(Paper for the National Safety Council Exposition) (1986). This paper was presented at two
sessions of the National Safety Council Congress and Exposition in Chicago, Illinois on
October 20 and 21, 1986.
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This limited protection has allowed management the opportunity to
abuse the practice of drug testing. Moreover, the lack of legal assistance
has placed an additional burden on the unions to ensure the preservation
of employee rights.6
As will be discussed in the following pages, the union defends the rights
of its members primarily through negotiation and representation in
arbitration. Consequently, these union functions play a significant role in
the issue of drug testing.
The most important aspect of negotiation is bringing management to
the bargaining table. Generally, the National Labor Relations Act
[hereinafter NLRA], recognizes two forms of bargaining-mandatory and
permissive. 7 If a subject of bargaining is mandatory pursuant to Section
8(d) of the NLRA,s the employer is required to bargain in "good faith to
impasse." 9 However, if a topic is permissive, the decision to bargain is left
solely to the discretion of the parties.10 Given this distinction, the
determination of drug testing as either a mandatory or permissive subject
of bargaining is of great importance to the unions in assuring the
protection of employee rights."
Finally, union representation in arbitration also plays an integral role
in the protection of its members. 12 Thus, it is important to understand the
current trends in arbitration on the issue of drug testing in order to
determine the degree of success unions are achieving in guarding
employee rights.
II. DRUG TESTING
The concern over chemical dependency in the work place has grown
dramatically in the last decade. 13 Recent studies have indicated that 10
6 Id. at 31.
7 See First Nat'l Maintenance Co. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981); Allied Chem. &
Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971); Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
a Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act states in pertinent part: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)).
' See First Nat'l Maintenance Co., 452 U.S. at 674; Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local
1,404 U.S. at 179; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 379 U.S. at 211.
'o See section III of this Note.
" See National Football League Players Assoc. and National Football League Manage-
ment Council and the National Football League, at 64 (Oct. 25, 1986) (R. Kasher, Arb.);
Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electrical Workers, System Council U-9, at 18 (Oct. 9, 1986)
(J. Aarons, Arb.); Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, Local Union 1900,
Arb. No. 16-30-0110-84 at 21 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.).
12 See Section IV of this Note.
" DPARTmENr OF HEALTH & HumAN SERV., Eivscr OF DRUGS ON DavnIo, Pub. No. 85-1386
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to 23% of all workers use dangerous drugs while on the job.14 In response
to the drug problem, it is estimated that nearly 30% of all Fortune 500
companies are requiring pre-employment drug screening. 15 Additionally,
the percentage of Fortune 500 companies testing current employees has
been found to be as high as 30%;16 one-quarter of these companies
terminate employees who test positive.1 7 Thus, drug testing has become
a substantial factor in the movement to thwart substance abuse in the
work place.' 8
The increased use of drug testing has raised many scientific, legal, and
ethical concerns. These concerns include the limited reliability of urine
testing, as well as the limited availability of legal relief from invasive
testing procedures. In order to better understand the technical and legal
problems faced by organized labor it is first necessary to examine the
scientific makeup of the prevalent drug testing procedures.
There are numerous methods of testing available to the employer.' 9
These tests include: the blood test,20 the breath test,21 the brainwave
test,22 and the urine test. 23 While each of these procedures possess similar
invasive qualities, the most common, 24 and the only one to be addressed
in this Note, is urine testing.
(1985). In 1982, 20 million people were using marijuana; 30% of the entire population had
tried marijuana; and 11% of the population used marijuana in the last year.
14 J. Masi & M. O'Brien, Dealing with Drug Abuse in the Workplace, Business & Health
30 (Dec. 1985). This study indicates that one out of ten workers use illegal drugs on the job.
15 C. Cornish, Drug Testing and Treatment and the Law 1 (Apr. 4, 1986) (unpublished
manuscript)[hereinafter Cornish]. These statistics were derived from a study undertaken by
the National Institute of Drug Abuse in 1986. Of the companies which conducted the
pre-employment screening, it was reported that two-thirds refused to hire applicants who
tested positive. PRESIENT'S COMMIssIoN ON ORGANIZED CuRME, AMERICA'S DRUG HABrr: DRuG AMusE,
DRuG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CR=I 430 (1986).
1e See supra note 14. Additionally, 30% of the Fortune 500 companies use Employee
Assistance Programs [hereinafter EAPI as an alternative to disciplinary action. Drugs on
the Job, Tw, Mar. 17, 1986, at 57.
17 See Cornish, supra note 15.
's See supra note 1. The total estimated annual cost to the United States from alcohol
and drug abuse as of 1983 was 135 billion dollars; 75 billion dollars was attributed to
reduced productivity in the workplace. Id.
" Alcohol and Drugs in the Workplace, Spec. Rep. (BNA) 31 (1986).
20 Id. Blood tests, while extremely accurate, and able to measure functional impairment,
have been found to be too complex and expensive to use regularly in the workplace.
"' Id. Breath tests are limited to the use of alcohol detection. However, they have
frequently been used by employers; and they are capable of measuring functional impair-
ment.
22 Id. The brainwave test measures chemical changes in the brain which emit electrical
charges. The charges become altered upon impairment with both drugs and alcohol. In
addition, the test is able to measure functional impairment. It is manufactured by National
Patent Analytical Systems, Inc. and is marketed under the name of The Veritas 100.
23 Id.
24 id.
1988]
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The urine test most widely utilized by the employer is the Enzyme
Multiple Immunoassay Technique [hereinafter EMIT].25 The EMIT test
is attractive to employers for several reasons.26 First, the test is ex-
tremely economical, 27 costing approximately ten dollars per sample.
Second, the EMIT test has been marketed as an "on site" screening test,
making it relatively simple to administer and requiring only minimally
experienced personnel. 28
The EMIT test is based on complex immunochemistry. 29 Manufactur-
ers of the test claim an accuracy rate of 99% under "optimal conditions".30
Independent studies, however, have demonstrated that under certain
conditions the EMIT test yields false results up to 37% of the time.31 Not
surprisingly, this extreme sway in reliability has been met with great
concern by organized labor. 32
There are several reasons for the potential unreliability of the EMIT,
the most prevalent of which stems from technological defects and
procedural errors. Lack of specificity,3 3 i.e., the tests inability to distin-
guish between certain non-drug components and drug components, is the
most pronounced technological flow of the EMIT.34 This occurrence is
called cross-reactivity.3 5 Cross-reactions are caused by the use of numer-
ous over-the-counter medical products as well as by certain organic
foods.36
25 STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL SERVICE, DRUG TESTING IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 12 (June
12, 1986).
26 id.
27 R. Geraghty, Drug Testing, STUDENT LAW. (Dec. 1986).
28 Id.
29 Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, 16 J. PSYCHOACTVE
DRUGs 306 (Oct.-Dec. 1984).
30 Id.
3" See infra note 40. There have been three main studies on the reliability of urine tests:
the O'Connor Regent Study which indicated a 17% false positive rate; the New Jersey
Department of Corrections which indicated a 25% false positive rate on cannabinoid
testing; and the 1985 Survey-Center of Disease Controls which indicated a 37% false
positive rate.
32 In the matter of arbitration between the Potomac Electric Power Company and Local
Union 1900, Arb. No. 16-30-0110-84. (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.) the union contended
that implemented testing procedures were unreliable and that they resulted in unjust
discipline of employees who tested positive. The arbitrator looked to the testing procedures
including the laboratory used, its past history of reliability, the use of confirmation tests,
and current statistics on drug testing reliability. In this case, he held that there was no
proof or reason to believe that the drug tests were unreliable.
" See supra note 29, at 309.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See supra note 26. Cross-reactions have resulted from such over the counter
medications as Nuprin, Contac, and Advil. Additionally, some natural substances, such as
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Procedural errors, on the other hand, account for a majority of the
discrepancies in the EMIT test. Experts have discerned that the
"hallmark" of reliable testing is a qualified laboratory with state-of-the-
art equipment utilizing highly skilled laboratory technicians. 37 Yet, due
to the multitude of laboratories needed to handle the recent demands for
urine testing, the necessary quality standards have not routinely been
met.3 8 What has resulted is too many laboratories offering testing
services without stringent quality assurance methods.39 In addition,
many of these laboratories are not clinical in nature, and therefore are
exempt from federal inspections or licensing.
40
Due to the inequities of the EMIT, the manufacturers, 41 as well as
numerous authorities, have recommended that a confirmation test be
given in order to verify all positive screening results.42 Confirmation tests
use highly specific and accurate testing methods designed to yield
extremely reliable results.43 Of course, with this high degree of reliabil-
ity, there is an increased cost-80 to 100 dollars per sample.
As a result of the increased cost of the confirmation test, many
employers have relied solely on the results of the EMIT to ascertain if an
employee is chemically dependent. Given the technical and procedural
flaws of the EMIT, it is evident that an employer's failure to confirm a
positive urine test will inevitably result in the unjust discipline or
discharge of innocent employees.
In addition to the flaws of the EMIT, there are several design limita-
tions of urine testing in general. The most prevalent limitation is urine
testing's failure to indicate "functional impairment", i.e., impairment at
poppy seeds, which are found on over 1.5 billion Burger King hamburgers sold each year,
have caused cross-reactions.
" E. Kaufman, The Testing of Urine Specimens for Drug Abuse 1O (Nov. 1986)
(Smith-Kline Bio-Science Laboratories outline for a symposium on drug abuse) (Nov. 1986)
(available at the Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Law
Library).
38 See supra note 29, at 313.
39 Id.
40 S. Budiansky, Busting the Drug Busters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 20, 1986),
at 70.
"' The leading manufacturer of the EMIT screening test is Syva Corporation. Another
popular screening test is the abuscreen test, which is manufactured by Roche Diagnostics.
See supra note 19, at 31.
42 See supra note 19, at 31. Confirmation tests require clinical laboratory toxicologists.
The tests used are: thin layer chromatography; gas chromatography; and gas chromag-
raphy/Mass Spectrometry.
Confirmation tests are recommenced by: The National Institute of Drug Abuse; The
National Medical Services; and Dr. Carlton Turner, Presidential Advisor on Drug and
Alcohol Abuse.
43 See supra note 19, at 31.
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the time of the test.44 The urine test also is unable to identify frequency
or quantity of use.45 These shortcomings, as well, have raised concerns
regarding the overall fairness of the urine test.
Due to the problems surrounding the reliability of drug testing, several
legal theories have been advanced challenging its use in the workplace.
Employees have looked to constitutional, legislative and judicial relief.
Because this Note primarily concerns those interests of union members
in the private sector, the legal aspects addressed in this section will
specifically pertain to that group of employees.
Generally, constitutional claims may only be brought by governmental
employees alleging state action. 46 However, private sector employees
may find protection under the Constitution in limited situations where
an employer implements testing procedures pursuant to a federal
regulation.47
To date, legislative action addressing the issue of drug testing has,
however, also provided limited relief to the private sector. 48 There has
been some progress in the form of municipal legislation. 49 For example,
the City of San Francisco recently enacted an ordinance,50 one of the first
of its kind, prohibiting the use of drug screening in certain circumstances.
The ordinance states, inter alia, that drug testing can only be imple-
mented: (1) when an employer has reasonable belief of impairment; (2) in
situations where impairment of an employee would place others in
4 Unions have argued that because urine tests cannot prove functional impairment,
employers are unjustly placing restrictions on the off duty behavior of employees. In
addition, it has been proven that certain components from the ingestion or passive
inhalation of marijuana can remain in the body for up to 30 days. Therefore, an employee
who may have merely been present in a room with people smoking marijuana or ingested
the drug weeks ago in the privacy of his or her own home, may test positive. See supra note
5, at 3.
However, the arbitrator, in the matter of Arbitration between Potomac Electric Power
Company and Local Union 1900, found that a positive urine test while not proof of
functional impairment, indicates a "high probability" that the worker was impaired on the
job. This decision is currently on appeal. Potomac Electric Power Co. and Local Union 1900,
Arb. No. 16-30-0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.).
5 See supra note 5, at 3.
46 See supra note 5, at 5, 26-27.
4 Constitutional claims brought by public sector employees are generally under the
fourth amendment right to privacy, and the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. See supra note 5, at 5.
48 See supra note 5, at 5.
'9 It is important to note that there are also a number of narcotics bills before the United
States Congress which support drug testing. The House Committee on Education and
Labor, Subcommittee on Health and Safety held hearings on the Impact of Alcohol and
Drug Abuse on Worker Health and Safety on October 31, 1985 and December 12, 1985. The
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing on Drug Abuse in
the Workplace on May 7, 1986. None of the hearings focused on any proposed legislation.
" San Francisco, Cal. Ordinance 527-85 (May 7, 1986).
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danger; and (3) if the employer provides the employee with an opportunity
to have the sample re-tested.
The legislative progression of drug testing appears to be taking a
similar route to that of polygraph legislation. Accordingly, such an
analogy indicates eventual state and federal action. 51 However, while the
future may show some promise for legislative relief, the present potential
for the abuse of drug testing illustrates an imminent need for the
protection of employee rights.
Finally, employees who have been injured through management's
institution of drug testing may attempt to seek relief in a civil court.
Several tort actions sought by employees have included defamation, 52
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 53 wrongful discharge,5 4 and
negligence. 55 On the whole, however, these actions have provided relief
only to a very few, and only in a limited number of circumstances.
Union members, moreover, have been given even less of an opportunity
to obtain a civil remedy. In some jurisdictions, union members under a
collective bargaining agreement which provides for alternative grievance
procedures, have been prohibited by the courts from pursuing civil
litigation.5 6
Because the legal system offers limited relief in this area, private
sector employees are vulnerable to invasive testing procedures. This lack
of legal protection has allowed management to readily implement drug
testing, and has forced union members to rely solely upon the rights
found in their collective bargaining agreements. Accordingly, this has
placed a tremendous burden on the unions to ensure sufficient employee
protection in the collective bargaining process, and further, to compe-
tently represent union members in grievances over drug testing pro-
grams. The following sections of this Note address these issues by
determining the bargaining status of drug testing pursuant to Section
8(d) of the NLRA; and by evaluating the results of a cross section of
arbitration decisions involving the issue of drug testing.
" A large number of states have enacted laws regulating polygraph testing. To date, 28
states have some kind of legislation on the issue. The laws range from complete bans to
restrictions on testing, and the questions asked. There is also federal legislation pending.
See H.R. 1524, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 1815 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986).
52 See, e.g., Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
" See, e.g., Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981).
54 See supra note 5, at 27.
55 See supra note 5, at 29.
5e See Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703, 704 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985); but see, Harper v. San Diego Transit
Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir. 1985) (actions for employer torts in violation of public
policy survive preemption doctrine).
1988]
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III. THE BARGAINING STATUS OF DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
The collective bargaining process is of major importance to organized
labor. The ability to bargain over controversial issues enables the unions
to adequately protect the interests of its members, avoid later disputes,
and prevent arbitrary unilateral actions by employers.57 The bargaining
process is statutorily provided for in Section 8(d) of the NLRA. Section
8(d) has been interpreted as establishing two types of bargaining rights:
mandatory and permissive.5
Mandatory subjects of bargaining are those which fit into Section 8(d)'s
statutory phrase, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment."' 9 When a subject is classified as mandatory, Section 8(a)(5)
requires that the topic be negotiated in good faith to impasse.60 This
status of negotiation is reached only if both parties fail to come to an
agreement after discussing all of the possible options available; failure by
either party to respect this interest is considered an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA.61 Generally, all other subjects which fall outside of the
statutory language of Section 8(d) are considered to be permissive. 62 In a
situation involving a permissive subject of bargaining, the decision to
negotiate is left entirely to the discretion of the parties; there is no
statutory obligation to negotiate. 63
Therefore, labeling of drug testing programs as either mandatory or
permissive is of crucial importance to the unions. It is the determining
factor in establishing whether or not the union will have a voice in the
implementation and structuring of drug testing programs. With this in
mind, the issue to be addressed in this section is whether a management
decision to unilaterally implement drug testing is a subject of mandatory
bargaining within the statutory phrase of Section 8(d), "terms and
conditions of employment."
s F. BARTusic & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 281-332 (2d ed. 1986).
58 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981); Allied Chem.
& Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971);
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
59 The statutory language of section 8(d) states in pertinent part: "the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment." National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(d)).
60 ,e nnprn note R.
61 Id.
62 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 675 (1981); Allied Chemical & Alkali
Workers Local 1, 404 U.S. at 179; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 379 U.S. 211.
61 Permissive subjects of bargaining are all those subjects which are not mandatory or
illegal. They include, but are not limited to: prices, product design, financing, benefits for
retired employees, performance bonds, indemnification clauses, and industry promotion.
See supra note 57, at 293.
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The courts have recognized that Congress intentionally used the
indefinite language "terms and conditions of employment," to enable the
National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB] freedom of
interpretation6 4 "in light of changing industrial conditions."65 The Su-
preme Court has intimated that the process of determining a topic's
bargaining status is twofold.66
The Court has ruled that, initially, a topic must fall within what has
been judicially interpreted as the meaning behind the statutory language
of Section 8(d). A subject meeting this qualification is, on its face, a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court, however, has further
required that a subject not be, what the Court has termed, a "man-
' Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 (1964)(Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart, while recognizing the NLRB's need for the expansion of
mandatory collective bargaining subjects, rejected the theory stating:
I am fully aware that in this era of automation and on rushing technological
change, no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than those
involving job security and employment stability. Because of the potentially cruel
impact upon ... the working men and women of the nation, these problems have
engaged the solicitous attention of government, of responsible private business,
and particularly of organized labor.
It is possible Congress may give organized labor a heavier hand, in controlling
what to date have been found to be prerogatives of private business management.
That path would make a sharp departure from traditional principles of a 'free
enterprise' economy.
Id. at 219; See also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1979).
However, there is legislative history which strongly supports the theory that congress
did not intend that mandatory subjects be restricted by formal guidelines. Congress set forth
that: "The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula, it
will inevitably depend upon the traditions of industry, social and political climate at any
given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors." H. Min. Rep.
No. 245, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
Additionally, Professor Bernard Meltzer has commented that:
The NLRB has tended to expand the bargaining duty in response to new
conditions ... That expansion has frequently been independent of direct legal
compulsion and has resulted from changing technology, changes in parties views
as to what subjects should be governed by jointly determined rules, and from
determination of unions to exert economic power to enlarge the area governed by
jointly determined standards. Expansion has been the primary characteristic of the
scope of mandatory bargaining... (emphasis added)
L. MoniJsKA, NLRB PsAcncr 290 (1983).
65 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981). Additionally,
others have suggested that expansion is, in reality, a primary characteristic of mandatory
bargaining topics. Note, The Duty to Bargain: Bargainable Issues, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 279-83
(1955).
r6 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 379
U.S. 203.
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agement prerogative".67 Given this second limitation, a subject which is
facially mandatory within the interpreted meaning of Section 8(d), will
only be considered a true mandatory subject if, ultimately, it is not found
to be a management prerogative.
Thus, to effectively determine drug testing's bargaining status, two
determinations are necessary: first, whether such testing falls within the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 8(d); and second, whether it is
a matter outside of the area of management prerogative. If it is found that
drug testing satisfies both of these determinations, only then will it be a
mandatory bargaining topic, and only then will management have a
statutory obligation to negotiate.
In resolving the question of whether drug testing is a mandatory
subject, the first of the aforementioned determinations requires a judicial
analysis of the requirements of Section 8(d).
The Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,6s
[hereinafter "Fibreboard"] established several guidelines to determine a
topic's bargaining status under Section 8(d). The Court, relied upon three
specific criteria: (1) whether the subject in question falls within the literal
meaning of the statutory language of Section 8(d); (2) whether the subject
is of "vital concern" to both the employer and the employee; and (3)
whether the bargaining practices of other industries include the subject
as a bargaining topic.
The first criteria in Fibreboard requires a determination as to what
qualifies as "effecting the . .. terms and conditions of employment"
pursuant to Section 8(d). Case law on subjects possessing similar char-
acteristics to those of drug testing have set forth specific incidents which
may play an important role in determining this issue.69 For example, the
67 See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 379 U.S. at 219; First Nat'l Maintenance Co., 452
U.S. at 675.
68 398 U.S. 203 (1964). The Supreme Court in Fibreboard granted certiorari to
determine the following questions:
Was the petitioner required by the NLRA to bargain with a union representing
some of its employees about whether to let an independent contractor for
legitimate business reasons undertake performance of certain operations in which
those employees had been engaged? Was the Board, in a case involving only a
refusal to bargain ennnmwo, to nrdrer tho r,,,nrntion of fnortio- -hich ho
been discontinued for legitimate business reasons and reinstatement with back
pay of the individuals formerly employed therein?
Id. at 209.
69 See Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp. and Local 847, 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975); Gerry's
Cash Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Tidee Prod., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 133
(1969).
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implementation of drug testing programs has been closely compared to
early cases involving the use of the polygraph test.
70
In Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital and Local 847,71 [hereinafter Mid-
South] the NLRB found the implementation of polygraph testing to be a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the statutory guidelines of
Section 8(d). The facts of that case revealed that Mid-South Hospital
suffered substantial damage due to vandalism committed by employees
prior to picketing. The hospital, after failing to receive union consent,
executed the use of a polygraph test conditioned upon employee acquies-
cence.
The union asserted that the unilateral implementation of polygraph
testing without negotiation was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA. The NLRB agreed, concluding that the institution of a poly-
graph test as a requirement of continued employment was a substantial
change in both the conditions of employment and past hospital policy.7
2
The Board held that the "promulgation of a new prerequisite to condi-
tioned employment" directly impinged upon the job security, and there-
fore was a "term and condition" subject to negotiation. Furthermore, the
Board reasoned that the new testing policy was a significant departure
from the hospital's previous practice of "human assessment".
The holding in Mid-South found there to be two determinative factors
in evaluating a testing procedure's qualification as a mandatory subject
of bargaining pursuant to Section 8(d): (1) the severity of the resulting
discipline;73 and (2) the amount of variance in the new procedure,
compared to past company practice.7 4 Where these factors have a consid-
erable effect on the present "terms and conditions" of employment, the
rationale of Mid-South dictates that a subject is mandatory pursuant to
Section 8(d).
However, in an instance where an employer's action only minimally
effects an employee, the reasoning of Mid-South indicates that a subject
70 See supra note 5, at 73. Polygraph testing has commonly been compared to drug
testing.
71 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975).
72 Clash Between Drug, Alcohol Tests and Privacy Rights Debated at American Bar
Assoc. Meeting, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) Vol 4, at 1214 (Aug. 25, 1986). At an ABA
meeting on August 21, 1986, drug testing's status as a subject of collective bargaining was
debated. Stephen Pepe, a labor attorney with the O'Melvey & Meyers law firm, stated that
there was a duty to bargain over drug testing programs. Mr. Pepe explained that because
of the possibility of disciplinary action, the implementation of testing programs would
substantially effect the "terms and conditions of employment" thereby qualifying it as a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Id.
This Note will further expand on Mr. Pepe's theory, specifically focusing on the court's
and legislature's interpretation the meaning of "substantially effect" with regards to the
use of drug testing programs.
" Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp. and Local 847, 221 N.L.R.B. at 672.
74 Id. at 673.
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may not qualify as mandatory. For example, where an employer initiates
a new testing policy, and the resulting discipline is merely the require-
ment to attend an employee assistance program,75 it is entirely possible
that the policy in that instance would be deemed to have only an indirect
effect on the employment relationship, and therefore not be a mandatory
subject.
Similarly, where an employer has demonstrated a long history of drug
testing in the work place, unless the newly implemented program is
significantly different from the company's past practices, the parties have
mutually consented to those terms as a part of their current bargaining
agreement.76
Therefore, the determination of a test's bargaining status depends
largely upon the degree to which the above criteria affect the existing
"terms and conditions of employment." 77 The holding in Mid-South
intimates that unless a testing procedure only minimally touches the
current employer-employee relationship, it will be found to substantially
alter the terms and conditions of employment. Where this is the case, a
drug testing program will fall within the literal meaning of Section 8(d)
and satisfy the first criteria of Fibreboard.
The second and third criteria in Fibreboard,78 as set forth earlier are
more easily applied to the topic of drug testing.
The second criteria, which required that a subject be of "vital"
importance to both the employer and employee, 79 is satisfied by the
implementation of drug testing programs due to the fact that an employ-
7' An EAP is an employer-sponsored rehabilitation center for employees who suffer from
chemical dependency, or various psychological disorders. Approximately 30% of the Fortune
500 companies utilize EAP's as an alternative to disciplinary action. See Cornish, supra
note 15.
71 See Brotherhood. of Maintenance, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N.R.R., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th
Cir. 1986)(the Court determined that the testing procedure was not a significant departure
from previous company practices).
It is important to note that the most common change in testing procedures has been the
employer's requirements for giving the test. This is exemplified where the prior practice of
an employer indicates testing only upon reasonable suspicion, but the new testing
procedure is random in nature. Where a substantial discrepancy of this sort is found, it has
been widely held that an employer is obligated to bargaining collectively. See Metropolitan
Edison Co. and System Council U-9, (Oct. 9, 1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.).
77 There is additional case law indicating that management's execution of testing
Procedures alne a!ets the m0 yrepoyerltosi enug t- ...-mah them .--
mandatory. See NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1966). Similarly, the NLRB and the courts have ruled that the implementation of
psychological testing programs, and mental stress examinations, impact the employment
relationship to such an extent that they constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. See
Gerry's Cash Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021 (1st Cir. 1979).
' Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 (1964).
79 id.
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er's need to maintain safety in the work place, counterbalanced by the
employee's right to privacy is unquestionably of "vital" importance to
both management and organized labor.8 0
The third criteria, which required that the bargaining practices of
other industries include the subject as a bargaining topic,"' is also
satisfied by the implementation of drug testing policies due to the fact
that the topic of drug testing has been traditionally included under the
categories of work rules and safety procedures which are commonly
incorporated in bargaining agreements.8 2
Thus, the second and third criteria of Fibreboard are satisfied by the
topic of drug testing. As a result, where an implemented drug testing
program meets the first requirement of Fibreboard, as examined previ-
ously in this Note, the program will facially83 qualify as a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
However, as was discussed earlier, a subject's qualification as facially
mandatory is only the first of two requirements which must be satisfied
prior to its recognition as a mandatory subject. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in addition to the statutory requisite has further required that a
bargaining topic be outside the area of management prerogative.
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,84 the Supreme Court
reasoned that while some decisions are unequivocally mandatory due to
their direct impact on the employment relationship, others with a
seemingly similar relationship are primarily focused on a management
concern. With this in mind, the Court held that "bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for
labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, out-
weigh the burden placed on the conduct of business."85 The Supreme
Court, thus, requires that a topic be outside the area of "management's
prerogative."86
80 See supra note 5, at 42.
st Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 379 U.S. 203.
82 See supra note 57, at 292.
" The term "on its face" is used in this Note to identify a subject which qualifies under
the statutory language of section 8(d) of the NLRA, and the holding in Fibreboard, but has
not been determined to be outside the "core of entrepreneurial control."
84 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
85 Id. at 678.
" The Court's implementation of the balancing test in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB [hereinafter FNM] takes into consideration only those concerns of
management and intentionally, fails to recognize the legitimate interests of organized
labor. Thus, the Supreme Court's pro-management implications make it apparent that
where employer's interest in a specific area outweigh what the Court perceives to be any
resulting benefit from negotiation, a subject otherwise within the statutory confines of
mandatory bargaining will be judicially deemed a management prerogative.
Indeed, Justice Brennan in his dissent in FNM questions the majority's institution of a
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Given this second qualification, while drug testing on its face may
satisfy the statutory language of Section 8(d), if it is found to be a
management prerogative, it will not ultimately qualify as a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
Generally, in the case of the unilateral implementation of drug testing
programs, employers have forcefully asserted that they are not required
to bargain over drug testing policies because they have a management
prerogative to ensure the safety of the work environment.8 7 However,
with the exception of certain industries highly predisposed to danger,88
and unavoidable emergency situations8 9 where management's need for
safety is imminent, the NLRB and the courts have intimated that drug
testing does not fall within the the area of management prerogative. 90
The holding of the NLRB in the previously discussed case of Mid-
South9' strongly supports the premise that drug testing is not a manage-
ment prerogative. In that case, the hospital additionally argued that they
had the right as an employer to use a polygraph test to aid in the
investigation of vandalism allegedly committed by hospital personnel.
The Board, however, rejected the hospital's contention, ruling that
"adopting the polygraph testing is not within the prerogative area which
an employer can exercise the core of entrepreneurial control. ' '92 In its
opinion, the Board expanded on its reasoning as to why the polygraph test
fell outside of the zone of management prerogative, specifically stating
balancing test. He stated: "This one-sided approach hardly serves 'to foster in a neutral
manner' a system for resolution of these serious, two-sided controversies." First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 690 (1981)(J. Brennan, dissenting).
17 See Brotherhood of Maintenance, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N.R.R., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th
Cir. 1986); Medicenter Mid-South Hospital, 221 N.L.R.B. 607 (1975); Potomac Electric
Power Co. and Union Local 1900, Arb. No. 16-30-0110-84 (Oct. 9, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.).
" Generally, inherently dangerous industries such as the airlines have been recognized
as having a management prerogative to ensure the safety of its passengers. Boeing to Test
All New Job Applicants for Drugs, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep., (BNA) No. 219 A-8 (Nov. 13,
1986). However, it should be noted that even in situations where danger would seem
inherent, such as in nuclear power facilities, arbitrators have not allowed management to
flagrantly violate an employee's right to privacy. Metropolitain Edison Co. and System
Council U-9 (Oct. 25, 1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.).
89 Chairman Murphy, in the Board decision of Medicenter, Mid South Hospital and
Local 847 221 N.L.R.B. 607 (1975), found that "whether or not the polygraph program is a
andator.7 bargaining subjet [tho hneidpnt1 rrPdtPd sn Pm.rnryc 'diatinn excusing
or justifying such unilateral action as a temporary measure to try to bring that situation
under control." Id. at 608.
'o See Brotherhood of Maintenance, Lodge 16, 802 F.2d 1016; International Bhd. of
Electrical Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 634 F.Supp. 642 (D.D.C.
1986); Medicenter Mid-South Hospital, 221 N.L.R.B. 607 (1975).
91 221 N.L.R.B. 607 (1975).
92 Id. at 609.
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that it was not a managerial decision "fundamental to the basic direction
of a corporate enterprise." 93
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees u. Burlington Northern
Railroad94 lends further support to the premise that drug testing is not a
management prerogative. In that case, the railroad unilaterally imple-
mented new drug testing procedures in response to several recent
accidents believed to be related to substance abuse. Burlington, inter alia,
asserted that it had a management prerogative to implement drug
testing procedures to insure a safe work environment.
The court allowed the proposed testing procedures, holding that they
were minor changes in the prior testing practices of the railway.95
However, the court rejected Burlington's argument that drug testing was
a management prerogative. Moreover, in his dissent, Judge Arnold
stated that "the railroad and the employees may ultimately come to an
understanding that Burlington National's proposed method ... is the best
way of approaching this problem. However, that result must be reached
through arms-length bargaining between parties."96
Additionally, union attempts to seek temporary restraining orders in
order to thwart the implementation of drug testing, have resulted in
several federal district court opinions.97 These opinions have also sup-
ported the conclusion that drug testing does not fall within the ambit of
management prerogative.
In Electrical Workers, Local Union 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power
Co., 98 the court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the
Potomac Electric Power Company to stop the implementation of drug
testing, pending arbitration.99 The judge, while recognizing the "terrible
menace" of substance abuse in the work place, stated "that does not mean
we have to resort to hysterical measures."'10 0 Further, the judge held that
"[i]n my opinion the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of this
lawsuit at least in the sense that the draconian measures which the
93 Id.
94 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
'5 Id. The court's holding was pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88.
s Brotherhood of Maintenance, Lodge 16, 802 F.2d at 1024 (J. Arnold, dissenting)
(emphasis added),
" See International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power
Co., 634 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
98 Id.
" Id. Although the court firmly ruled in favor of the union in this case, the union was
unsuccessful in stopping the company's unilateral action in arbitration. The arbitrator
ultimately held that management did have the authority to introduce the new drug testing
procedures. This decision is discussed at length in Section IV of this Note. See Potomac
Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, Local 1900, Arb. No. 16-30-0110-84 (June 30,
1986) (H. Zurnas, Arb.).
100 See International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power
Co., Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at D-1 (March 21, 1986).
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defendant has proposed and perhaps implemented cannot be unilater-
ally imposed under law without exhaustion of some procedures under the
collective bargaining agreement."101 The judge concluded that if the
testing were allowed, employees would be forced to "undergo invasions of
privacy which are almost unheard of in a free society .... ,,1o2
The holdings of the above-mentioned cases indicate that to date, the
courts have not been willing to include drug testing in the category of a
management prerogative. Given this, where a drug testing program
satisfies the criteria of Fibreboard as discussed previously in this Note, it
will be a mandatory subject of bargaining pursuant to Section 8(d) of the
NLRA.
IV. A FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ARBITRATION DECISIONS
ON THE ISSUE OF DRUG TESTING
As a result of the incorporation of alternative grievance procedures
within most collective bargaining agreements, disputes over manage-
ment's implementation of drug testing programs have primarily been
decided in arbitration. This section will discuss several of the most recent
arbitration decisions, highlighting the factual and legal issues evaluated
in those opinions.10 3
A. Arbitration Decisions
In the matter of arbitration between the Potomac Electric Power
Company and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union 1900,104 the arbitrator allowed the Potomac Electric Power Com-
pany [hereinafter PEPCO] to unilaterally implement drug screening of
employees suspected of substance abuse. In this case an employee notified
PEPCO management of a problem involving the sale and use of illegal
narcotics at The Potomac River Generating Station [hereinafter Po
River]. PEPCO, which operates Po River responded by utilizing a private
investigation firm to look into the allegations. The investigation revealed
the use and sale of marijuana, PCP, and heroin at Po River.
Consequently, PEPCO implemented a search using trained dogs to
detect the presence of controlled substances in both employee lockers and
1o Id. (emphasis added).
102 Id.
1o3 Metropolitan Edison Co. and Electric Workers, System Council U-9, (Oct. 9, 1986) (J.
Aarons, Arb.); Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electric Workers, Local 1900, Arb. No.
16-30-0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.); National Football League Players Assoc.
and National Football League Management Council, (Oct. 25, 1986)(R. Kasher, Arb.).
104 Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, System U-9, Arb. No. 16-30-
0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.)
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motor vehicles. 10 5 The contents of all lockers and motor vehicles which
were indicated by the dogs as containing drugs were thoroughly searched.
Additionally, PEPCO requested all suspected employees to submit to
urine testing;10 6 failure to respond resulted in disciplinary action. At the
completion of the investigation, PEPCO discharged three employees, and
placed the remainder on probation.
At arbitration, the union asserted that PEPCO randomly tested the
employees without "probable cause", an action inconsistent with the
company's past practices, 0 7 in violation of the bargaining agreement. 0 8
In opposition, PEPCO argued that management, due to a dramatic
increase in drug and alcohol abuse in the work place, has a "special
responsibility to assure that its employees are drug free." Moreover,
PEPCO asserted that a broad management rights clause'0 9 included
within the current collective bargaining agreement gave them the right
to promulgate rules against drug abuse.
The arbitrator held that PEPCO's unilateral implementation of drug
testing was acceptable, premised upon his finding that the testing was
reasonable and based upon legitimate safety needs consistent within the
collective bargaining agreement.
It was determined that the implemented drug testing was to be
considered a safety procedure within the confines of a broad management
rights clause in the current collective bargaining agreement. Moreover,
the arbitrator found that PEPCO, in light of the potential for danger
inherent in the industry, had the right and responsibility to ensure that
employees performing complex duties were not under the influence of
drugs. Finding this, he held that so long as there was a "valid reason" to
105 Id. at 5. All search teams included a union representative.
o Id. at 9. The actual drug test used by PEPCO was the EMIT for the initial screening,
and the GSMS (Gas Chromagraph-Mass Spectrometry) to confirm all positive EMITs.
107 Id. at 18. Under a memorandum issued in April of 1986, PEPCO instituted a drug
policy as part of the personnel services policy No. 304. This policy required urine testing
when a "triggering event" gave the company reason to inquire into a possible policy
violation. "Triggering events" were qualified as: acting strangely, appearing in possession
of a controlled substance, a serious accident, or tips from police, the public, or other
employees.
'08 Id. at 19. The arbitrator held that there is no such requirement that PEPCO must
have 'probable cause" prior to conducting a search.
o The management rights clause states in pertinent part:
Article 19.02 of the Agreement pertaining to health and safety authorizes
PEPCO to formulate and publish safety rules to which the employees shall be
required to conform.
Further, Section 20.01 provides, in pertinent part:
However, it should be understood that the establishment and enforcement of
safety and health rules and regulations is a proper function of management and
to this end the final determination for the adoption and implementation of safety
and health rules shall be the sole responsibility of the Company.
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believe that an employee was impaired, PEPCO had the right to
implement drug testing.
The matter of arbitration between Metropolitan Edison Company and
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-9,110
[hereinafter Metropolitan Edison] involved a factual situation similar to
that presented in PEPCO, but ironically resulted in a different outcome.
It is important to note the arbitrators' particular areas of concentration in
these cases in order to understand their contradictory decisions.
In Metropolitan Edison, a dispute arose when management advised
representatives of the System Council that they intended to unilaterally
implement, without Council consent, a new drug and alcohol policy. The
new policy, titled "Employee Fitness for Duty Procedure/Drug and
Alcohol,""' required all production, maintenance and clerical employees
be subject to random urine testing, including such testing during routine
physical examinations.
In support of the new policy, the Metropolitan Edison Company
[hereinafter Met Ed]) argued in arbitration that there was a potential for
"serious mishaps" in the operation of a nuclear power facility, rendering
safety considerations paramount. Met Ed also asserted that there had
been a long history of prior company policies involving drug and alcohol
abuse, and that these policies provided a strong basis for "contractual
propriety" of the newly proposed program. 112 Additionally, the company
claimed that an "employer-employee relationship" clause 1 3 in the cur-
rent collective bargaining agreement clearly enumerated its right to
implement the new drug policy without union consent.
110 Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electric Workers, System Council, U-9, (Oct. 9, 1986)
(J. Aarons, Arb.).
11' Id. at 8. "Employee Fitness for Duty Program/Drug and Alcohol," Section 4.2.1 of the
collective bargaining agreement.
112 Past company practices were demonstrated in the prior GPU Nuclear Policy state-
ment on the issue of drug testing, issued November 16, 1981, which stated in pertinent part:
1. [Any person] found to be using, possessing or under the influence of such
substances on the nuclear station site shall be immediately terminated from
employment and thereafter denied access to all GPU System nuclear stations.
Provided, however, based on the circumstances the Company in its sole discretion
may reduce the foregoing disciplinary action to not less than two (2) weeks
suspension without pay for an employee's first violation of mere possession.
2. [Any person] reasonably suspected of using, possessing or being under the
i~ncepa oir chcbtanrc on the nuclar station site shal11be: a. subject to aon
immediate and full investigation by Company security personnel, and b. denied
access to the Station pending the outcome of the Company's investigation.
1" Article II, entitled "Employer-Employee Relationship," Section 2.15 states:
'It is understood by the parties to this agreement that the right to hire, to transfer,
to reassign, to demote, to discipline, to lay off and to discharge employees for
proper cause, is vested in the Company, subject to the limitations of this
Agreement."
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The union, however, contended that the new drug testing procedures
were a "sharp departure from past practice," and that the drastic change
in the "terms and conditions" of employment violated the union's right to
negotiate. The union further argued that in the event the company had
the right under the collective bargaining agreement to implement the
new drug policy, the policy should nevertheless be rejected because its
random nature precluded a finding of reasonableness.1
14
Arbitrator Aaron quite effortlessly determined that Met Ed had the
right under the current collective bargaining agreement to unilaterally
implement a new drug testing policy. The ease of his decision focused on
both the realization of the dangers involved with substance abuse in the
work place, as well as a broad prerogative of management incorporated in
the bargaining agreement. 1 6
However, the arbitrator qualified his holding on this broad manage-
ment right by stating that "such policies and/or rules shall not be
contrary to law or the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." In
evaluating the consistency of the proposed test with the collective
bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that a positive test would
inevitably result in disciplinary action. But the arbitrator also found
that, according to the "Employer-Employee Relationship" clause of the
bargaining agreement, any resulting disciplinary action must be for
"proper cause". Thus, the arbitrator found that because random drug
testing would result in discipline without "proper cause", it was incon-
sistent with the current bargaining agreement, and could not be unilat-
erally implemented.
In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator held that the term "proper
cause" has "varying linguistic modes", from which the most appropriate
definition is qualified as "some reasonable grounds or suspicions or basis
for employer action ... [for] testing employees to find misconduct.", 1" 6 The
alternative, it was held, "of permitting broad employer action,.., strips
114 Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electric Workers, System Council U-9, at 10 (Oct. 9,
1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.). When referring to the term "reasonable" the union was inferring to
"reasonable suspicion" or "belief" that an employee tested has been using drugs.
11s The broad management clause in the bargaining contract states:
In the interest of safety, continuity of service, and efficient and orderly operation,
the Brotherhood agrees that its members will abide by the Company's rules and
regulations. Accordingly, it is understood by both the Brotherhood and the
Company, that all rules and regulations now in effect or as adopted or changed in
the future shall be strictly enforced and observed at all times. However, no rule or
regulation shall be adopted which is contrary to the law, or to the terms of this
Agreement, except at a legally enforceable order of an agency of the Government.
... Metropolitan Edison Co. and Electric Workers, System Council U-9, at 10 (Oct. 9,
1986)(J. Aarons, Arb.).
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employees of basic rights which are incorporated in the concept of 'proper
cause.' "117
Finally, Arbitrator Aaron emphasized that there were other equally
effective and less intrusive methods of determining substance abuse in
the work place. Moreover, he held that an employer who finds it
necessary to implement random drug procedures must negotiate such
policies with the existing union and may not unilaterally implement
these programs in violation of the current collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Arbitrator Zumas in the previously discussed case of PEPCO seemingly
paid close attention to balancing the issue of reasonableness versus safety
in the work place. It may be suggested, however, that Arbitrator Aaron
in Metropolitan Edison, alternatively looked to the four corners of the
bargaining agreement, and gave considerably less weight to the issue of
reasonableness in his rejection of management's newly proposed testing
program.
In PEPCO and Metropolitan Edison the parties had dealt with drug
testing programs resulting from past company practice or policies, but
the parties had never specifically negotiated over drug testing proce-
dures. The final case examined in this section illustrates how arbitrators
are evaluating the unilateral implementation of such procedures where
testing has been previously negotiated in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
In the matter of arbitration between The National Football League
Players Association and The National Football League Management
Council,118 [hereinafter NFL Arbitration] the National Football League
Players [hereinafter NFLPA] successfully prevented Commissioner Pete
Rozelle [hereinafter Commissioner] and the National Football League
Management Council [hereinafter NFLMC] from unilaterally instituting
a new drug program.
In the negotiation of their 1982 collective bargaining agreement the
NFLPA and the NFLMC established Article XXXI: "Flayer's Rights to
Medical Care and Treatment."' 19 The Article enacted a collectively
117 Id. at 16.
"' National Football League Players Assoc. and National Football League Management
Council, (Oct. 25, 1986) (R. Kasher, Arb.)
119 Article XXXI of the collective bargaining agreement:
Players' Rights to Medical Care and Treatment
Section 5. Standard Minimum Pre-Season Physical: Beginning in 1983, each
player will undergo a standardized minimum pre-season physical examination,
outlined in Appendix D, which will be conducted by the Club physician. If either
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bargained policy for detection of drug abuse and the education and
treatment of players determined to be chemically dependent. It provided
that a centralized organization would be used to: (1) evaluate chemical
dependency facilities, (2) provide education on the subject of substance
abuse, (3) test players reasonably suspected of being chemically depen-
dent, and (4) protect the confidentiality of medical reports and the names
of players involved. Club physicians were also permitted to, upon
reasonable cause, send players to the organization for testing and
chemical abuse problems.
However, in January of 1986, discussions began between the NFLMC
and the NFLPA with the intent to modify Article XXXI. The parties
agreed upon several of the proposed modifications, but the NFLPA
the Club or the player requests a post-season physical examination, the Club will
provide such an examination and player will cooperate in such examination.
Section 6. Chemical Dependency Programs: The parties agree that it is the
responsibility of everyone in the industry to treat, care for and eliminate chemical
dependency problems of players. Accordingly, the parties agree to jointly desig-
nate Hazeden Foundation, Century City, Minnesota or its successor if such
becomes necessary, to evaluate existing facilities to assure the highest degree of
care and treatment and to assure strictest observance of confidentiality. Any
treatment facility which does not meet standards of adequacy will be eliminated
and a successor facility in the same metropolitan area chosen by Hazelden.
Hazelden will be responsible for conducting an ongoing educational program for
all players and Club personnel regarding the detection, treatment and after-care
of chemically dependent persons. The cost of retaining Hazelden will be paid by
the clubs.
Section 7. Confidentiality: All medical bills incurred by any player at a local
treatment facility will be processed exclusively through Hazelden which will
eliminate all information identifying the patient before forwarding the bills to
any insurance carrier for payment. Details concerning treatment any player
receives will remain confidential within Hazelden and the local chemical depen-
dency facility. After consultation with Hazelden and the player, the facility will
advise the club of the player's treatment and such advice will not in and of itself
be the basis for any disciplinary action. No information regarding a player's
treatment will be publicly disclosed by Hazelden, the facility or the club.
APPENDIX D.
STANDARD MINIMUM PRE-SEASON
PHYSICAN EXAMINATION
Urinalysis
Check for (including but not limited to):
-Protein
-Glucose
-PH Factor
-Diabetes
-Renal Failure
-Gout
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refused to agree to the NFLMC's proposal requiring, inter alia, that all
players would be subject to two unscheduled drug tests during each
season, in addition to the scheduled pre-season testing.
In July of 1986, Commissioner Rozelle, in spite of the Parties' failure to
reach an agreement, nevertheless unilaterally implemented the proposed
modifications to the existing drug policy. The Commissioner relied upon
his authority under Section 8.13(A) of the National Football League
[hereinafter NFL] Constitution and By-laws and Article VIII of the
current collective bargaining agreement. These provisions allowed the
Commissioner broad authority to protect the integrity and public confi-
dence in the game of professional football.' 20
The NFLPA contended in arbitration that Commissioner Rozelle did
not have the authority under either Article VIII of the current collective
bargaining agreement, or Section 8.13(A) of the NFL Constitution and
By-laws to alter the terms and conditions of the bargaining agreement
without the consent of the NFLPA.
The arbitrator labeled this case a "classic dispute" between manage-
ment rights and specific employee rights in the collective bargaining
agreement. He held that, although originally the organization may have
120 Disciplinary Powers of Commissioner:
8.13(A) Whenever the Commissioner, after notice and hearing, decides that an
owner, shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a member club, or any
player, coach, officer, director or employee thereof, or an officer, employee or
official of the League has either violated the Constitution and Bylaws of the
League, or has been or is guilty of conduct detrimental to the welfare of the
League of professional football, then the Commissioner shall have complete
authority to: (1) Suspend and/or fine such person in an amount not in excess of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), and/or (2) Cancel any contract or agreement of
such person with the League or with any member thereof.
ARTICLE VIII
COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE
Section 1. Commissioner Discipline: Notwithstanding anything stated in Arti-
cle VII of this Agreement, Non-Injury Grievance, all disputes involving a fine or
suspension imposed upon a player by the Commissioner for conduct on the playing
field, or involving action taken against a player by the Commissioner for conduct
detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football, will be processed exclusively as follows: The Commissioner will promptly
send written notice of his action to the player, with a copy to the NFLPA [National
Football Player's Association]. Within 20 days following written notification of the
SJ~nlbiffe . Icnuh WIC Playe ainCu ulluvy UL Limt nlr tr, IL tile
approval of the player involved, may appeal in writing to the Commissioner. The
Commissioner will designate a time and place for hearing, which will be
commenced within 10 days following his receipt of the notice of appeal. As soon as
practicable following the conclusion of such hearing, the Commissioner will
render a written decision, which decision will constitute full, final, and complete
disposition of the dispute, and will be binding upon the player(s) and club(s)
involved and the parties to this Agreement with respect to that dispute.
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had an "existing right" to conduct drug testing, when the parties
collectively bargained, and agreed to certain drug testing provisions, both
parties are then obligated to respect those provisions. Thus, he deter-
mined that the issue of drug testing had already been resolved in the
1982 negotiations and included in the collective bargaining agreement.
The arbitrator held that the Commissioner's proposed drug program
was a "document affecting the terms and conditions of employment of
NFL players," and that where specific provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement conflict they supersede those proposed. As a result,
the portion of the proposed drug program which required unscheduled
testing, was found in conflict with the specific provisions of Article XXXI
that required testing only for reasonable cause, and was therefore not
permitted.
B. Summary Analysis
An overview of the above-mentioned arbitration decisions demon-
strates the complexity of the issue of drug testing and employee rights
under a collective bargaining agreement. Although the difficulties in-
volved in the analysis of these decisions are compounded by the unique-
ness of each bargaining agreement, there is a great deal of consistency in
the rationales supporting the resulting decisions. The arbitrators, as a
whole, considered three specific areas in making their determinations:
(1) management rights as enumerated in the bargaining contract; (2) the
consistency of the proposed test with the current agreement; and (3) the
reasonableness of the testing procedure utilized.
The initial objective of the arbitrators was to determine whether
management had the right under the current bargaining contract to
unilaterally initiate new drug testing programs. Management's right, if
any, to take such action was found by the arbitrators to fall within the
employer's right to provide a safe work environment. Accordingly, the
arbitrators looked to management rights clauses, 121 safety clauses, 122 and
other provisions vesting management with extended dominion 123 in order
to ascertain the scope of their authority within the contract. The
employer's past practices in the area of safety rules were also a deter-
mining factor.124
Not surprisingly, all three of the arbitration decisions analyzed in this
Note, regardless of their outcome, found management had the right to
implement new testing procedures. This broad managerial authority to
121 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124 See Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electrical Workers, System Council U-9, at 14 (Oct.
9, 1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.).
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enact safety policies was justified from collective bargaining agreements.
Due to the union's failure to limit management rights in this area,
management was given the upperhand in instituting testing policies. The
unions, as a result, must pay close attention to the amount of control
conceded to management to execute safety policies.
Maintaining consistency with the existing bargaining contract has
been the greatest hurdle for management in initiating new drug testing
policies. Although a majority of arbitration decisions to date have allowed
employers the right to implement safety procedures, such as drug testing,
they have been very insistent upon requiring that such policies adhere to
the current bargaining agreement. Generally, consistency has been
evaluated in three respects: (1) consistency with all other existing terms
and conditions of the bargaining agreement; (2) consistency with past
practices not specifically negotiated within the current contract; and
(3) consistency with specifically negotiated terms concerning drug testing
found within the collective bargaining agreement.
In the first situation, where drug testing policies have not been
negotiated, the arbitrators required that the newly proposed testing
procedures be consistent with all other terms and conditions of the
current collective bargaining agreement. This was illustrated in Metro-
politan Edison where the new testing procedures were disallowed as
inconsistent with the current contract. 125 The arbitrator found that
because a positive drug test may result in disciplinary action, it could
only be utilized upon "proper cause" as required by the disciplinary
procedures set forth in the current bargaining agreement. It was held
that the proposed use of random testing without "proper cause" was
inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the current contract, and
therefore could not be adopted.
In the second situation, the arbitrators required that the proposed
testing procedures be consistent with past drug testing policies. The
arbitrators found that where specific drug testing terms were not incor-
porated within the bargaining agreement, but employers had used drug
testing in the past, the parties had mutually assented to those terms.
Where this was found to be the case, the arbitrators concluded that the
past practices of the employer, even though not specifically negotiated,
were terms of the bargaining agreement.
The holding in PEPCO demonstrates this point.126 In that case the
arbitrator held that the past practices of management were to use drug
testing only upon reasonable belief of impairment. Accordingly, Arbitra-
125 See Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electrical Workers, System Council U-9, at 18 (Oct.
9, 1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.).
126 See Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, Local Union 1900, Arb. No.
16-30-0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (H. Zumas, Arb.).
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directed at only those employees who had been initially identified by the
trained dogs as possessing drugs. Therefore, he ruled that this particular
use of drug screening was consistent with the past practices of the
company, and was an acceptable method of testing. 127
The third situation encounted by arbitrators involves the rare collec-
tive bargaining agreement in which drug testing procedures have been
specifically negotiated over and those terms of the negotiation have been
incorporated within the bargaining agreement. The arbitrator in NFL
Arbitration determined that the terms specifically set forth in the
bargaining agreement will supersede any proposed terms which are in
conflict. 128 In that case, the specific terms of the existing contract
requiring testing only upon "reasonable cause" were found to supersede
the proposed terms for unscheduled drug testing. It is therefore, impor-
tant that the union be specific in addressing the issue of drug testing in
negotiation, in order to adequately protect employee rights.
In some cases arbitrators have also evaluated the reasonableness of an
implemented drug testing policy. 129 Determinations on this issue have
been non-contractual in nature, and have been found to arise from the
instilled constitutional values of the arbitrators. 130 As a result, many
arbitration decisions involving the implementation of drug testing pro-
grams have involved a balancing test to evaluate the necessity of a safe
work environment versus employee rights.13 1 Because such balancing
tests can be extremely subjective, the issue of reasonableness has been
the most difficult to predict when attempting to determine the future
outcome of an arbitration decision. Issues which are commonly balanced
by arbitrators include: industry danger, 32 past drug problems, 33 meth-
ods of testing,134 reliability of testing,13 5 reasons for testing,"36 the
necessity of proving functional impairment, 37 and the overall inva-
siveness of a test on an employee's right to privacy.
127 Id. at 36.
128 See National Football League Players Assoc. and National Football League Manage-
ment Council and the National Football League, at 64 (Oct. 25, 1986) (R. Kasher, Arb.).
129 See National Football League Players Assoc. and National Football League Manage-
ment Council and the National Football League, (Oct. 25, 1986) (R. Kasher, Arb.);
Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electrical Workers, System Council U-9, (Oct. 9, 1986) (J.
Aarons, Arb.); Potomac Electric Power Co. and Electrical Workers, Local Union 1900, Arb.
No. 16-30-0110-84 (June 30, 1986) (N. Zumas, Arb.).
"' See supra note 5, at 19.
131 See supra note 5, at 14.
132 id. at 37.
'33 Id. at 39.
134 Id. at 41.
135 Id. at 45.
131 See Metropolitain Edison Co. and Electrical Workers, System Council U-9, at 15 (Oct.
9, 1986) (J. Aarons, Arb.).
137 See supra note 5, at 15.
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The arbitration cases of PEPCO and Metropolitan Edison demonstrate
the subjectivity and the inherent potential for inconsistency of the
balancing process. In both of these cases the arbitrators stressed the
importance of a safe work environment. However, in PEPCO the arbi-
trator accorded great deference to the issue of reasonableness. He found
that managements' responsibility to provide a safe work environment,
compounded by the widespread use of illegal substances in the work place
and the potential for danger in PEPCO's "safety sensitive" industry, far
outweighed any employee right to privacy. Conversely, in Metropolitan
Edison the arbitrator gave much more weight to the "contractual
propriety" of the newly proposed test. The arbitrator determined that
even though the operation of Met Ed was inherently dangerous the
testing procedure violated the "proper cause" requirement of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
The question of reasonableness, for the most part, has been given the
least amount of weight in determining the acceptability of drug testing
programs. In fact, some arbitrators have found it unnecessary to address
the issue at all, reasoning that a dispute over drug testing is solely
contractual in nature. This disposition was evident in the NFL
Arbitration138 where Arbitrator Kasher held that the issue of reasonable-
ness was not an important consideration in determining the contractual
relationship of the parties.139
The aforementioned analysis illustrates the three considerations of
arbitrators when evaluating drug testing policies. These consider-
ations-management rights, contractual consistency, and reasonable-
ness, and their interrelationships delineate the rights of both manage-
ment and labor in the arbitration process. Accordingly, the above
arbitration decisions establish several key considerations for organized
labor in both negotiation and representation in arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated that organized labor's effectiveness in
negotiation is imperative to the adequate protection of its members from
invasive drug testing procedures. Negotiation must be achieved by
asserting that drug testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining for the
reasons set forth in section III above.
The best results in negotiation will be evidenced where the union
representative is aware of both the technical and procedural short
comings of drug testing, as well as, the inequities of the collective
13' See National Football League Players Assoc. and National Football League Manage-
ment Council and the National Football League, at 64 (Oct. 25, 1986) (R. Kasher, Arb.).
139 Id.
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bargaining agreement in question. For these reasons, this Note has
highlighted those areas which the unions must address in negotiation in
order to prevent the unilateral implementation of drug testing programs.
Primarily, the unions strategy should center, not around -disallowing
testing procedures, but around bargaining for a procedure which will
most effectively preserve both the privacy rights of its members, as well
as a safe work environment.
Although the courts and legislators to date have provided the private
sector employee with limited protection, this Note has shown that where
the unions are well informed and able to thoroughly negotiate over drug
testing, the private sector employee can enjoy a safe work environment
free from invasive testing procedures. Thus, the unions are not left
helpless holding the specimen jar-as the title of this Note may suggest,
rather they are holding the key to effective protection of employee
rights-negotiation.
ROYCE ROBERT REMINGTON
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